State Use of Propaganda (Part 1): Russia- Removing the 'maskirovka' on 'dezinformatsiya.'

A Futuristic Dystopian City, generated by Dall-E; from OpenAI.

After establishing a base for understanding in Exploring Propaganda: A General Overview and Synopsis of Selected Resources for Further Reading, one way to examine propaganda is by reviewing the most capable and far-reaching group. These groups primarily comprise State actors (e.g., The United States, Russia, China, etc.). The focus of this research will be related to the use of propaganda by Russia. One caveat to this post is that while proxy organizations are utilized for disinformation campaigns, they will not be presented in an expansive overview for this post. This will be performed following the second part of the State-related research effort (In progress- State Use of Propaganda [Part 2]: The U.S. in War and Peace) for a two-part examination of Non-State actors (In Progress- Non-State Actors Use of Propaganda [Part 1]: Terrorism, Propaganda, and Radicalization and Non-State Actors Use of Propaganda [Part 2]: Proxies and Propaganda.). Before beginning an overview of the Russian use of propaganda, general information regarding the actor involved will be provided for context and relevant background information.

Russia-General Information

Raeff et al. (2023) state that Russia consists of territory in eastern Europe and northern Asia, with Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] (2023) providing that Russia borders two oceans (the Arctic and the North Pacific) and has a total land area of approximately 17,098,242 sq km (1.8x the size of the U.S.). Of this, about 22,407 km are defined as land boundaries that border 14 other countries, with a coastline of approximately 37,653 km [With maritime territorial boundaries extending 12 nm, a contiguous zone of 24 nm, and an exclusive economic area of 200 nm.] (CIA, 2023). CIA (2023) supplies that the climates (e.g., steppe, subarctic, etc.) and terrain (e.g., low hills, forest, mountain, etc.) vary across this vast area, which is home to an estimated 141,698,923 people (primarily concentrated in the westernmost regions). The top three ethnic groups (from nearly 200) are: Russian [77.7%], Ta tar [3.7%], and Ukrainian [1.4%]; who most likely speak the official language of Russian [85.7%], Tatar [3.2%], and Chechen [1%]; and (if) practicing follow beliefs affiliated with Russian Orthodoxy [15-20%] and Muslim [10-15%]; and with a large percentage [65.99%] falling within the age range of 15-64 (median age is 40.3 years) and an expected declining birthrate [-.24%] (CIA, 2023).

History Overview

Raeff et al. (2023) note that there has been a presence of humans within the areas of historical Russia since the 2nd millennium BCE, highlighting the diverse origins of this population. Following initial economic explorations in the early 800s (which would shortly see a decline), the next notable event was the expansion of the territory under the control of the Rus. The establishment of an identifiable and cohesive control of the domain (c. 980-1015) was achieved by Vladimir, with a significant amount of power shifting to what is known as the Kievan Rus [i.e., the Rus who primarily ruled from Kyiv.]. However, internal and external factors saw the decline of power and the transition to various other locations, such as Novgorod, before settling in Muscovy during a period of Mongol invasion (CIA, 2023; Raeff et al., 2023).

CIA (2023) states that following the nascent period of Muscovy, the area continued to increase in importance and prominence, culminating in establishing the Romanov dynasty (est.17th Century), which would rule until overthrown in 1917. The author notes that this period transitioned under the control of Le in, who established the communist state, which later became the USSR during the Cold War period. Following the collapse of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin was elected President before the current Russian President Vladimir Putin (2000-2008;2012-present) formed the government into a more authoritarian leaning system(CIA, 2023). The recent unwarranted invasion of another sovereign state, Ukraine, began in 2022; showing an increase in earlier tensions following Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

Russia and Propaganda

Russian use of propaganda can be seen within a historical context (Elliott, 2018; National Museum of the Holodomor-Genocide, 2019; Smith, 1988; Zimmer, 2013), as well as being observed within the recent past or present (Almond et al., 2022; Bronk et al., 2022; Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency [CISA], n.d.; Elliott, 2018; Heintz, 2023; ISW, 2023; Jensen, 2018; Kasprzyk et al., 2021; Moore & Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2019a, 2019b; Morgan, 2016; NewsGuard, n.d.; NIC, 2023; ODNI, 2023; Paul & Matthews, 2016; Perez & Nair, n.d.; Pravda, n.d.; Quadri, 2023; Rai, 2023; Staff, 2023; Treyger et al., n.d.). Without going into an extensive overview of the literature and information for Russia and Propaganda, there are a few concepts, terms, or ideas that are foundational and important. These are 'maskirovka,' 'dezinformatsiya,' and the Firehouse of Falshood Model (Elliott, 2018; Moore & Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2019a, 2019b; Maier, 2016; Paul & Matthews, 2016; Smith, 1988). Following the outlining of these concepts below, additional concepts and some tactics used in misinformation will be briefly presented (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency [CISA], n.d.; Jensen, 2018; Kasprzyk et al., 2021; Perez & Nair, n.d.).

Maskirovka and Dezinformatsiya

Maskirovka is described as being used by the current Russian President, Vladimir Putin- most notably for the U.S. during the 2016 election (Elliott, 2018); however, the use of 'maskirovka,' as it applies Russian deception doctrine/operating concept, can be seen historically despite adapting as time progressed (Maier, 2016; Moore & Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 2019b). A critical aspect from Maier (2016) is that following World War II, maskirovka began to see an increase in the use of disinformation and simulation (sustained into the present), a continuation of concealment (not for surprise but to create ambiguity). Another is that the in the course of internal Russian debate, 'obman' may be a more contemporary term for continued research and the difference with the U.S. conceptualization of deception. Morgan notes many aspects of 'maskirovka' [an overarching system or process {as indicated by Moore and Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2019a;2019b), Maier (2016) and Smith (1988)}, designed to facilitate various types and forms of deception-related activities and objectives], such as concealment, simulation, and disinformation (i.e., dezinformatsiya).

Smith (1988) describes concealment as similar to the U.S. term (e.g., to eliminate or reduce detection) inclusive with 'camouflage.' Maier (2016) provides examples such as terrain masking or using darkness with this 'form' (Smith, 1988). As Smith (1988) provided, simulation is the presentation of activities associated with an imitation. The author details an example of smoke with inflatable aircraft. Maier (2016) indicates that the line between imitation and simulation involves either passive or active involvement (or elaboration) to support a narrative meant to conceal either intent or action. The author provides one example of simulated troop movements (small as more significant would likely classify as a demonstration). Disinformation (dezinformatsiya) uses false information, half-truths, and lies to achieve an informational and strategic/operation/tactical advantage (Morgan, 2016; Smith, 1988). Maier (2016) states that dezinformatsiya can be broken into two sub-categories, political and military; while Smith (1988) supports the underlying association with Russian disinformation groups described in Moore and the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2019a). Smith (1998) and Maier (2016) emphasize the importance (as a doctrinal outline) of activity, plausibility, variety, and continuity to understanding maskirovka and disinformation (i.e., dezinformatsiya [Moore and the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats [2019a;2019b]).

The Firehouse of Falsehood Model

Paul and Matthews (2016) provide an excellent example of the Firehouse of Falsehood Model. From the authors, key features are that it is high-volume and multi-channel; it is rapid, continuous, and repetitive; it lacks a commitment to objective reality; and it is not consistent. A logical conclusion is that this form is helped by the current technological easily facilitatesI.O.hese traits. Paul and Matthews (2016) imply that these (and the model) are made to take advantage of well-researched events.

Additional Concepts and Tactics Overview

Moore and the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2019) list several other words/associated with maskirovka and Russian propaganda/disinformation (dezinformatsiya). Some of them, as indicated, are: 'dezinformatsiya, strategicheskaya maskirovka, and aktivnye meropriyatiya; with others being Information Operations (I.O.), psychological operations, concealment, and deniability.' In addition, the author ties this with the concept of 'soft power' and that active measures (i.e., aktivnye meropriyatiya) are aimed at sowing or amplifying internal discord within a targeted nation. Other notable concepts can be found in Kasprzyk et al. (2021), which present a mathematical model for I.O. Another vital aspect is tactics. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency [CISA] (n.d.) provides some of the most commonly used. Some notable ones from CISA (n.d.) are flooding the information environment, using unsuspecting actors, and cultivating fake or misleading personas. An example that embodies a few of these in combination can be observed in the "fake news," as referenced in Jensen (2018) and ODNI (2023) and implied by Almond et al. (2023). Bronk (2022), with Perez and Nair (n.d.), indicate that social media, the internet, and emergent/open-source technology are all prime areas to monitor (or continue to monitor) for emerging trends/vulnerabilities/etc. that could impact future cases of use by Russia and otherwise/elsewhere. Such technologies could be utilized to mobilize Russian compatriots or sympathizers (Zaken et al., 2015).

Conclusion

While Paul and Matthews (2016) present several challenges that the U.S. and its allies face in combatting Russian manipulation of information. Regarding the current war in Ukraine, for example. While Bronk et al. (2022) indicate a prior belief (given election meddling) to believe that Russian IO would be strong; the U.S. and other allies have made considerable progress in combatting or attempting to combat this threat, with Ukraine presenting as a formidable and excellent example (particularly regarding public support and countering narratives) [Bronk et al., 2022; The Associated Press, 2023; Ukraine, n.d.]. Bronk et al. (2022) find that while the strength of internal narratives is hard to gauge; external narratives propagated by Russia have performed less well than those of Ukraine. However, while current success against malign foreign influence exists and shows some success, a continued focus on combatting this threat is required. It will require coordination and collaboration both within the U.S. and outside by parties with a vested interest.

Additional Resources for Review

Additional resources for review are Dallin (1947) which presents a view into the Soviet world via media analysis/presentation. Of importance, a Google Scholar search indicated that this has a re-occurrence over several periods (given a cursory relational search). Another is Quinn (2017), who models the disinformation as a Russian Nesting Doll (i.e., 'Matryoshka Doll').

Note: Edited on 08/10/2023 for spelling issues, etc. by Author

References

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